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Evolving Ethnicity in South Asia 
With Particular Reference to India 
Introduction 
Joseph E. Schwartzberg 
Professor of Geography 
University of Minnesota 
The following survey of evolving South Asian ethnic-
ity generally supports the position of Paul Brass 
(1991, p. 8), who asserts that: 
. . . ethnicity and nationalism are not 'givens' but are 
social and political constructions. They are creations 
of elites, who draw upon, distort, and sometimes fab-
ricate materials from the cultures of the groups they 
wish to represent in order to protect their well-being 
or existence or to gain political and economic advan-
tage for their groups, as well as for themselves. 
[Further] ethnicity and nationalism are modem phe-
nomena inseparably connected with the modem cen-
tralizing state. 
I would attach more importance than Brass does, how-
ever, to the so-called primordial loyalties that inhere 
in one's birth. While these may not be immutable giv-
ens, they do represent a reservoir of cultural identifiers 
from which elites can draw as they assess specific 
political situations and make a calculus of the costs 
and benefits of seeking to elicit particular types of 
support. Among these identifiers are caste, religion, 
sect (which may be locally important, but which I can-
not explore in this brief paper), language, dialect (also 
not discussed), and regional loyalty. Birth within a 
particular group does matter. Cultural norms may be 
plastic, but they are not putty, to be molded at will. 
They are potent and they tend to endure. Hence, politi-
cians can go only so far in reshaping ethnic identities. 
I would also stress more than Brass and other political 
commentators do the importance of geographic are-
nas. I repeatedly refer in this paper to changes in polit-
ical boundaries and show that the political actors 
thrown together within the administrative limits of 
any newly reconfigured country or state adjust their 
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ethnic agendas accordingly. They base them not only 
on their own social and economic interests seen in iso-
lation but also on their perceptions of the interests of 
others in the same arena with whom they must com-
pete for limited political assets. Ethnic groups have 
sought to advance their interests by a wide variety of 
means. These include the formation and support of 
political parties and other organizations; selective sup-
port for nonethnic political parties and sympathetic 
candidates; discriminatory legislation when an ethnic 
group controls the government at a particular level; 
and, when the group is out of power, propaganda, 
strikes, demonstrations, economic boycotts, and so 
forth. Groups may also deliberately resort to the use of 
force, even to the point of large-scale insurrection . 
More often, however, violence occurs when confron-
tations with other groups or with the government get 
out of control. Violence has, in fact, at times marked 
virtually every type of ethnic movement discussed in 
this paper and has repeatedly affected every major 
region and virtually every state of India, as well as the 
other countries of South Asia (figure 9). 
The Government of India has responded to the politi-
cal demands of ethnic groups in ways no less varied -
than those used by the groups themselves. On numer-
ous occasions, as in regard to state reorganization and 
the demand for quotas, it has bowed to organized pub-
lic pressures. At the other extreme, it has often 
resorted to the use of substantial force, especially in 
dealing with secessionist movements in its border 
regions, whether they be of tribals in the northeast or 
Sikhs or Kashmiris in the northwest. Between these 
extremes, numerous options existed. At times the gov-
ernment successfully co-opted the leadership of spe-
cific groups, made expedient compromises with them, 
or acquiesced in their control over local polities, pro-
vided they did not transcend certain limits. Alterna-
tively, the central government has used its substantial 
control over fiscal resources and other economic 
levers to gain favor or punish dissent; it has also inter-
fered in numerous ways in local politics-a cause of 
particular alienation in the case of Kashmir--declar-
ing certain groups and activities illegal, jailing dissi-
dents, and frequently suspending the elected 
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Ethnic Violence in India, 1972-1990 
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legislative assembly and imposing President's or Gov-
ernor's Rule. 
The potential for serious and enduring damage to 
existing polities from ethnically rooted violence, both 
intranationally and internationally, is great and 
appears to be increasing. From 1972 to 1980, India 
experienced serious ethnic violence in 67 percent of 
all months, and South Asia as a whole experienced 
such violence in 95 percent of all months. For the 
period 1981 to 1990, the figures rose to 94 percent and 
100 percent for India and South Asia, respectively. 
From an ethnic perspective, South Asia is arguably the 
most complex and one of the most turbulent regions of 
our planet. Its political map is far from frozen. One 
may safely anticipate a number of changes in the fore-
seeable future, many of which will be driven by agen-
das of specific ethnic groups. Whatever these changes 
may be, they will, in turn, surely give rise to new 
manipulations of ethnic identities to suit the needs of 
new situations. 
This presentation considers the various historical pro-
cesses that have shaped ethnic identities in South 
Asia, concentrating, because of limitations of time and 
space, on India and on the postindependence period. It 
also discusses specific bases for establishing ethnic 
identities and the periods, situations, and locales in 
which they assumed importance. It also notes the 
means by which ethnic groups seek to advance their 
interests and by which governments respond to such 
efforts. I shall not, however, strive for completeness-
the topic is simply too vast. Omitted from consider-
ation here is any discussion of ethnic relations in 
Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, and Nepal. Even for India, I 
shall do no more than touch lightly on the two most 
troublesome contemporary ethnic problems: the Sikh 
struggle for an independent Khalistan and the com-
plex struggle in Kashmir being waged simultaneously 
by forces seeking independence, on the one hand, or 
merger with Pakistan on the other. Virtually all the 
empirical data that I shall be presenting are drawn 
from the updated 1992 edition of the Historical Atlas 
of South Asia, which synthesizes information from a 
multitude of sources, only a small part of which are 
noted in the bibliography accompanying this paper. 
Although the interpretations of those data are my own, 
I doubt that any are wholly original. 
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Processes of Ethnic Identity Formulation 
Birth into a particular group still matters far more in 
South Asia than it does in areas of other major civili-
zations. One is expected to be "true to one's salt"; 
one's essence and traditions are all determined by 
birth. 
Jati, which generally connotes caste, translates liter-
ally as birth. One is born into a particular caste in 
accordance with one's karma-the net merit or 
demerit of actions performed in previous existences. If 
one properly follows in the present life the forms of 
behavior appropriate to caste status, one may aspire to 
rebirth in a higher caste. This axiomatic belief forms 
the essence of Hindu dharma, which may be trans-
lated either as duty or religion. These observations are 
made with specific reference to Hinduism but are 
equally applicable to Buddhism and lainism. The 
behavioral norms on which they are based have 
strongly influenced communities of other coexisting 
faiths of South Asia as well, even Muslims, for whom 
the very notion of caste is theoretically anathema. For 
example, few Indian Muslims, before the creation of 
Pakistan, would have hesitated to identify the social 
group to which they belonged by a name that would 
conjure up in the minds of their non-Muslim neigh-
bors a particular caste-defined set of roles and a spe-
cific genre de vie. 
For most South Asians and for most of the region's 
history, caste was the principal referent of one's place 
in society. The vast majority of the population lived in 
villages in which their appropriate social and eco-
nomic roles were rooted primarily in caste. Social and 
intellectual horizons in such a setting were typically 
very limited, and political action, such as it was, was 
generally confined to a narrow spatial arena. Affairs of 
state were the domain of small classes of elite. 
Although the encompassing sacred realm of Bharat, or 
India, found a place in the consciousness of Hindus, 
communal activities at an all-India level were nonex-
istent. At a regional level, devotion to the cult of a par-
ticular deity or to a saintly figure and participation in 
major fairs and pilgrimages did provide some feeling 
of community, but the sensed bonds of religion, I 
would argue, were generally weaker, at least among 
Hindus, than were those of caste. 
The unification of India under the British and the 
accelerating expansion, thereafter, of the transporta-
tion and communications network, literacy, the press, 
and notions of democratic governance brought about a 
number of important changes in the way that people 
saw themselves and in their patterns of interaction. 
While identification with and loyalty to one's caste 
remained important, other social attributes became 
increasingly salient as wider arenas of economic and 
political interaction were established. New, more-or-
less Westernized commercial and bureaucratic elites 
came into being. Although they were mainly Hindu, 
these new elites drew also from other religious com-
munities and from many linguistic regions. In some 
situations, especially after the creation of the Indian 
National Congress in 1885, they formed the nucleus 
for an emerging PanIndian, nontraditional, national-
ism. In other contexts, however, socially and cultur-
ally defined groups vied with one another for privilege 
and power. Thus, in addition to their caste and reli-
gious identities, many Indians became increasingly 
aware of regional attachments that were previously 
only dimly sensed within areas dominated by a partic-
ular language or dialect. The range of politically rele-
vant primordial loyalties-those that form the basis 
for what we now recognize as ethnicity-was 
expanded accordingly. In a sense, then, we may say 
that one's identity--or jati-today means much more 
than caste alone. 
The British rulers recognized the latent potential for 
disunity inherent in the social and cultural complexity 
of the subcontinent, and they responded fitfully and 
often grudgingly to Indian demands for greater control 
over their own destinies. In each of a series of major 
constitutional reforms, such as the Indian Councils 
Act of 1909 and the Government of India Acts of 
1919 and 1935, they acknowledged the claims of spe-
cific minorities to separate electorates to guarantee 
some semblance of fair representation in the evolving 
legislative apparatus. At first only the Muslim popula-
tion was accorded special recognition. Subsequently, 
concomitant with an expanding franchise, elected 
seats were reserved also for Sikhs, Indian Christians, 
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Anglo-Indians, Europeans, and Scheduled Castes as 
well as for such special interests as Indian commerce 
and industry, European commerce, landholders, labor, 
and even women. Whether the course adopted was an 
attempt to gradually establish a liberal representative 
democracy or a cynical policy of "divide and con-
quer" depends on whose version of history one 
chooses to believe. In any event, a policy of recogniz-
ing the en bloc claims of particular constituencies to a 
share of the political pie was set firmly in place, 
thereby reinforcing ethnic sensitivities. 
The establishment of quotas remains a part of the 
political modus operandi to this day, although the 
rules for fixing quotas varied from one context to 
another. Some quotas are in strict proportion to popu-
lation. Depressed groups-officially designated 
"Scheduled Castes" and "Scheduled Tribes"-are 
guaranteed certain numbers of seats in national and 
state legislatures, of positions in various lower and 
middle levels of government employment, and of 
acceptances to institutions of higher education. Rules 
of this type are institutionalized in the Constitutions of 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh. Other informal quo-
tas for places on party tickets, for participation in state 
and provincial ministries, or for a share of the eco-
nomic largess over which certain agencies of govern-
ment have control, are more flexible and situation-
specific. These informal quotas are often determined 
by deals made by party bosses in response to promises 
of support or various pressures by specific groups. 
Institutionalized religious quotas are presently 
unthinkable within the secular democracy of India, but 
the Muslim voting bloc-roughly one-ninth of the 
total Indian electorate and much more than that in sev-
eral regions-retains an informal claim to a share of 
power. In Pakistan the small Ahmadiya sect, which 
the Constitution has declared to be outside the pale of 
Islam, has been allotted reserved seats in both the 
national and provincial legislatures, as have other 
minorities and women. 
Sociocultural identities in South Asia have never been 
fixed. The corporate mobility of particular groups, 
some ascending and others descending in the local 
social hierarchy, has been abundantly documented. So 
too has been the frequent creation of new groups 
through fission of older ones and the less common 
amalgamation or fusion of groups when that suited a 
particular purpose. While these processes have oper-
ated since ancient times, the pace of change has accel-
erated greatly over the past century. Many new forms 
of identity have been socially, and often deliberately, 
constructed in response to the evolving corporate 
agendas of would-be players on the political stage. 
The institutionalization of democracy and the atten-
dant politicization of more and more previously inert 
groups underlie these changes. Clever politicians have 
recognized that "pushing the right buttons" to elicit 
some sort of ethnically rooted response-whether 
based on religion, language, caste, tribal affiliation, or 
regional sentiment-was the most efficacious way of 
attracting a following and attaining power. Temporary 
alliances of convenience with others playing the same 
game were often established. This strategy was espe-
cially common in regions where few persons held 
deep ideological convictions. 
Types of Ethnic Identity in the 20th Century 
Emergent Nationalism 
Two political parties acted as the vehicle for the 
expression of emergent Nationalism during the pre-
independence period. The creation of the Indian 
National Congress in 1885 was an outcome of a newly 
nascent Indian nationalism. The Congress quickly 
became the principal Pan-Indian vehicle for the free-
dom struggle. When the Muslim League came into 
being in 1906, however, it embarked on a more paro-
chial course. It set its agenda as much by its percep-
tions of the likely effects of Congress activities on the 
welfare of India's Muslim community as on its views 
of the British raj. Not surprisingly, the League vacil-
lated between periods of cooperation with the Con-
gress and periods of fierce opposition to it. As powers 
were devolved toward the provinces, the importance 
of success in electoral contests gradually widened the 
rift between the two parties. Yet it was not until 1940 
that the die was irrevocably cast in favor of establish-
ing a separate state for India's Muslim community. 
The requisite ethnic rationale invented for that state 
was Muhammad Ali Jinnah's "two-nation" theory. It 
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was the idea that India's population consisted essen-
tially of a Hindu nation and a Muslim nation whose 
core identities and goals were so fundamentally differ-
ent that there was no hope that they could coexist 
within a single independent state without serious 
adverse consequences for the Muslim minority. In 
1947, Jinnah's dream of an independent Pakistan was 
fulfilled. At the same time, the Congress dream of a 
secular, all-embracing Indian nation was shattered. 
Partition and the massive population transfers that fol-
lowed still left roughly a third of South Asia's Mus-
lims in India; this concentration continues to provide a 
basis for ethnic tensions. The more than 100 million 
Muslims in India today constitute by far the world's 
largest ethnic minority. Few parts of the country are 
without a significant Muslim presence. Within the 
Indian-held portion of the disputed state of Jammu 
and Kashmir, Muslims form a substantial majority. 
The dispute over Kashmir has been the cause of two 
wars between India and Pakistan, and the area also fig-
ured prominently in the war that led to the indepen-
dence of Bangladesh. Within Kashmir a bitter 
multisided insurrection is now in progress as some 
separatists seek an independent state and others union 
with Pakistan. Sustained Indo-Pakistani enmity peri-
odically makes life precarious for India's Muslims 
despite the country's constitutional commitment to a 
secular state with religious liberty for all. 
Muslims, of course, are not the only significant reli-
gious minority in India. Five of India's 25 states have 
Sikh, Christian, or animistic majorities (figure 10), 
and, with the exception of the mainly tribal state of 
Arunachal Pradesh in the far northeast, all have been 
scenes of bitter ethnic struggles in the postindepen-
dence period. The most intense of these struggles is 
that of Punjab's Sikhs for an independent Khalistan, 
waged intermittently since 1981. The present period is 
one of relative quiescence, but the problem remains 
unresolved. I shall defer till later discussion of the eth-
nic struggles of several tribal regions. 
Figure 10 
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Linguistic Affiliation as an Organizing Principle 
Language, formerly of relatively little political impor-
tance, has since 1947 emerged as a potent political 
force in Hindu-majority areas despite the lingering 
role of religion as an aspect of ethnicity in postparti-
tion. As a matter of organizational convenience, the 
Congress Party, beginning with Bihar in 1908, began 
to organize itself into linguistic provinces, even 
though most of the provinces of British India and sev-
eral of the larger princely states were multilingual 
entities. It was not until 1920, however, that the Con-
gress Party established linguistic units throughout 
British India and made the creation of linguistic 
administrative provinces a plank in its platform for 
political reform. As Congress saw it, the arbitrariness 
of the political map that resulted from the unplanned 
history of British territorial acquisition in India was an 
affront to the natural aspirations of India's major lin-
guistic groups. In any event, the call for linguistic 
provinces was overshadowed as an issue by the more 
inclusive agenda of Gandhi's noncooperation move-
ment. Conceivably, an unstated motive in the Con-
gress Party's call for linguistic provinces was to divert 
popular attention away from communally based poli-
tics. 
The first postindependence demand for a linguistic 
state came from Telugu speakers, the largest among 
several major minorities in the then Tamil-dominated 
state of Madras. The demands persisted, and Congress 
conceded by establishing the new Telugu-speaking 
state of Andhra in 1954. This opened the floodgates to 
calls for additional states based on linguistic criteria. 
The government then established a States Reorganiza-
tion Commission to study the problem, and ultimately 
the States Reorganization Act of 1956 led to a radical 
redrawing of the political map. The 1956 Act, how-
ever, failed to divide the essentially bilingual state of 
Bombay and the putatively bilingual state of Punjab. 
These intentional departures from the new linguistic 
state norms were short lived. Bombay was partitioned 
in 1960 to form the Marathi-speaking state of Maha-
rashtra and the Gujarati-speaking state of Gujarat. In 
1966, Punjab was also partitioned, allegedly on a lin-
guistic basis, but in actuality on communal grounds; 
when the government acceded to the Sikh demands 
for a reconfigured Punjab, the reduced area of the new 
state was one in which Sikhs became an absolute 
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majority. Figure 11 reveals the extensive changes 
wrought by linguistic reorganization over the period 
1951-72. 
The government's conciliatory attitude in regard to 
linguistic reorganization did not mollify linguistic 
groups sufficiently to guarantee their loyalty to the 
Union government. Within Madras, in particular, a 
demand arose for an independent Dravidian nation-
sometimes dubbed "Dravidistan"-to comprise the 
four new linguistic states in which Dravidian lan-
guages were spoken. As matters transpired, the three 
other Dravidian states of South India showed rela-
tively little enthusiasm for a Tamil-led Dravidian 
nation, and the movement lost its momentum. But one 
lasting outcome was the rise to power of the Dravida 
Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), a Tamilian ethnic party 
established in 1949. Alone or at the head of a multi-
party coalition, the DMK has ruled Madras, or Tamil 
Nadu as it was renamed in 1969, for all but six years 
since it first came to power in 1967. Arguably, the pru-
dent willingness of the Congress Party to allow ethni-
cally minded Tamil politicians to enjoy the rewards of 
power did as much as the lack of separatist ardor in 
neighboring Dravidian states to blunt secessionist 
demands. Had the movement succeeded, it would 
almost certainly have led to the Balkanization of 
India. 
Demands for reorganizing the political map of inde-
pendent India were not all rooted in linguistic con-
sciousness. Several newly created linguistic states 
contained regions that lagged notably behind others in 
levels of economic and social development. As a rule, 
areas that had formed a part of British India were gen-
erally more advanced than those previously ruled by 
the less progressive princes, such as the Nizam of 
Hyderabad. Regions lagging behind the political core 
areas of the states to which they were joined soon 
sensed that the state was not doing enough to rectify 
the ill-effects of past neglect. This, in tum, led to sev-
eral demands for separation, fueled by local politi-
cians who sought to harness local discontent as the 
vehicle for furthering their own political ambitions. To 
what extent those politicians and their followers were 
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able to construct a regional sense of ethnicity cannot 
readily be determined, but none of these attempts to 
achieve a separate state succeeded. 
Another outcome of states reorganization was the 
escalation of what have been called "nativistic" move-
ments. In such movements the dominant linguistic 
group of a particular state, styling themselves as "sons 
of the soil," sought, by a combination of legal mea-
sures, intimidation, and violence, to limit the opportu-
nities of immigrant groups from other states-and 
sometimes of indigenous Muslims as well-and, in 
some instances, to create legal obstacles to their settle-
ment. The strongest of these movements were in 
Assam and Maharashtra. 
Tribal and Caste-Based Ethnicity 
A number of tribal groups who aspired either to state-
hood within the Indian union or to full independence 
were disregarded in the initial phase of the linguistic 
reorganization. In the mineral-rich Chhota Nagpur, in 
the northeast of peninsular India, tribals had estab-
lished a forerunner of the present-day Jharkhand Party 
as early as 1939. The party has campaigned intermit-
tently for a tribal state since the parliamentary elec-
tions of 1957. Other groups, most notably the Nagas 
and later the Mizos along India's northeastern borders, 
resorted to armed rebellion. Many among these fron-
tier tribals were Christians, almost all spoke languages 
unrelated to the major languages of the states in which 
they lived, and very few had reason to feel a deep 
sense of loyalty to India. Their struggles were at times 
abetted by foreign Christian groups as well as by Paki-
stan and China, all of which provided them with moral 
and/or material support. 
The Indian Government's attitude in dealing with 
tribal demands was generally less conciliatory than it 
was in respect to other ethnic groups. Ultimately, 
however, through a combination of military suppres-
sion, co-optation of compliant leaders, and other tac-
tics, accommodations were reached with elements of 
each of the rebellious frontier groups, and many new, 
tribally dominated administrative units-either union 
territories or fullfledged states-were established. The 
much more numerous, but also more pacific, tribal 
groups, however, continue to find their political aspi-
rations frustrated. 
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The role of caste in the postindependence period has 
changed considerably. In the past, power at the local 
level was typically shared by the dominant landhold-
ing group and the ritually supreme Brahmans. Each 
group legitimized the role of the other in its appropri-
ate sphere. With the coming of democracy, however, 
numbers, rather than ritual ascendancy or other claims 
to elite status, became increasingly important determi-
nants of power. Throughout India, at all levels of gov-
ernment and across the political spectrum, parties 
appealed to particular types of caste constituencies to 
gain support. Local magnates-believed to control 
large "vote banks" of their caste followers-offered 
their support to specific parties in return for a place on 
the ballot. Single castes rarely composed an absolute 
majority of the electorate; alliances among various 
caste groups were therefore common. 
Anti-Brahmanism had become a potent political force 
in some regions even in the preindependence period. 
The appeal of Charan Singh to a wide spectrum of 
middle-level peasant castes over much of the Hindi-
speaking area of India was a key factor in catapulting 
the J anata Party to power in 1978, following the 
period of emergency rule initiated by Indira Gandhi in 
1975. The desire for empowerment among middle-
level groups found expression during the period of 
Janata rule in the creation of the MandaI Commission, 
which drew up a report in 1982 suggesting a new set 
of quotas for the numerically strong so-called Other 
Backward Castes (OBCs) similar to those that the 
Constitution already guaranteed to Scheduled Castes 
and Scheduled Tribes. Although the Janata Party did 
not remain in power long enough to implement the 
provisions of the Commission's report, the decision to 
do so by a new National Front government in 1990 
touched off a wave of violent protest over large parts 
of India and contributed to the government's collapse 
shortl y thereafter. 
Below the OBCs in India's social hierarchy are the 
Scheduled Castes, formerly untouchables, who com-
pose roughly a sixth of the nation's total population. 
Their struggle for equality before the law and for 
humane treatment by traditionally superior groups has 
been a difficult one, reminiscent in many ways of the 
American civil rights movement in respect to blacks. 
In some parts of India, especially Bihar, the peas-
antry-for whom the Scheduled Castes mainly work 
as landless laborers-have responded with incredible 
brutality to attempts by Scheduled Castes to better 
their lot. In other areas, most notably Maharashtra, 
large numbers of the group have adopted a new ethnic 
identity by conversion to Buddhism, employing a 
social dynamic comparable to that of the Black Mus-
lim movement among blacks in America. Other Hari-
jans have been converting to Islam. 
Hindu Nationalism 
Hindu ethnicity sank roots even before the tum of the 
present century. Within the Congress Party there 
emerged the powerful conservative voice of a Marathi 
Brahman, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, who perceived in the 
increasing Westernization of India's elite the seeds of 
the destruction of Hindu culture. He sought, some-
times violently, to oppose the British presence. No 
less conservative in some respects, but far more toler-
ant of non-Hindu perspectives, was Mohandas Gan-
dhi. Gandhi's commitment to nonviolence and his 
fruitful collaboration with the liberal and secular-
minded Jawaharlal Nehru lessened the following for 
Tilak's brand of Hindu nationalism for decades but 
could hardly extinguish its appeal. Even before Tilak's 
death in 1920, Hindu nationalism was institutionalized 
in various guises, beginning with the Hindu Mahas-
abha, founded in 1907 in part as a reaction to the cre-
ation of the Muslim League. Although never posing a 
serious challenge to Congress, the Mahasabha was 
particularly influential in the period before and just 
after partition in fomenting anti-Muslim activities and 
in giving credibility to Jinnah's aforementioned two-
nation theory. Also noteworthy is the militant and fas-
cistic Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Vol-
unteer Association), one of whose members 
assassinated Gandhi in 1948. Founded in 1925, it 
remains a potent force, especially in Maharashtra, the 
region of its inception. 
Despite their high visibility and local prominence, no 
Hindu nationalist party in the postindependence 
period even came close to gaining control over any 
state legislature, not to mention Parliament, until 
1990. The Bharatiya Jan Sangh, however, gained 
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heightened respectability by being admitted into the 
hodgepodge anti-Congress Janata coalition that swept 
to power in 1977. The period 1990-91 witnessed a 
dramatic rise in the strength of the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP), successor to the Jan Sangh. This was 
especially marked in India's conservative Hindi heart-
land. 
Some observers of the Indian political scene anticipate 
that the BJP will be able to form the next government, 
either alone or at the head of a new anti-Congress coa-
lition. The changed fortunes of the Hindu nationalists 
may be attributed to a variety of factors. Among them 
are the termination of the Nehru family dynasty, the 
decline in public confidence in the long-ruling and 
increasingly corrupt and scandal-ridden Congress 
Party, and the failure of any other ideologically based 
party to win the allegiance of a major segment of dis-
enchanted Congress supporters. No less important has 
been the BJP's ability to project the sense that it stands 
for the true India. It appeals mainly to the landed, 
albeit nonelite, segments of the rural population and to 
the lower middle class of the urban population. Nei-
ther of these groups has previously enjoyed a large 
share of political power over any sustained period. 
Implicit in the appeal of the BJP is a certain rejection 
of Western influences, along with a generous dose of 
anti-Islamic sentiment vis-a-vis both Pakistan's and 
India's own Muslim population. 
The BJP's cynical exploitation of popular Hindu emo-
tional sentiment in regard to the controversial destruc-
tion of a 16th-century mosque allegedly built over the 
site of Lord Rama's birth put the BJP at the center of 
public attention and was instrumental in bringing on 
the most serious wave of Hindu-Muslim communal 
violence since the period of partition. This led to the 
dismissal of BJP ministries in four states in December 
1992 and their replacement by President's Rule. (This 
is shown on figure 12.) Some commentators argue that 
the BJP leadership is more representative of the true 
India than was the Congress Party-as well as less 
corrupt-and anticipate that, once in power, the party 
will act with a considerable degree of responsibility 
and will restore stability to the nation. I am inclined to 
doubt that assessment. 
Figure 12 
Proportion of India's Population in States Governed by Ethnic Parties, 1965-1993 
Percent 
40~---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------~ 
35 
30 
25 
20 
15 
10 
5 
For purposes of this graph, regional parties are considered as ethnic and the 
Union Territories of Delhi, Goa, Pondicherry, etc., are treated as States. 
The number of States or Union Territories governed by ethnic parties 
is noted for each year. 
Figures for each year are as of the month of March. 
8 
5 
3 
O~~~--~~~~~~~~-F~~~~~~~~--~~~~~--~~~~~ 
1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1993 
3491786-95 
140 
Postscript 
In legislative assembly elections held in November 
1993, the BJP suffered dramatic losses in three of five 
states in which it was formerly the ruling party, 
including Uttar Predesh, India's most populous state. 
On the other hand, it bettered its formerly dominant 
position in Rajasthan and won a smashing victory in 
Delhi. To a considerable extent, BJP losses were 
reflected in Congress gains. Whether, as some observ-
ers suggest, the 1993 elections signal that the BJP tide 
has crested and begun to fall remains to be seen. 
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Summary of Discussion 
Discussant: Robert Stoddard 
I am going to try to achieve two things: first, integrate 
content with what Alex Murphy said yesterday about 
general principles through an illustration in South 
Asia, using Sri Lanka as an example and, second, 
build upon what Dr. Schwartzberg has said about the 
background of ethnic diversity in South Asia, but giv-
ing a slightly different prediction about India's politi-
cal future. 
The ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka is primarily between 
the Sri Lankan Tamils and the mostly Sinhalese gov-
ernment. The Tamils want greater political control 
over their lives; therefore, they seek greater autonomy 
or even sovereignty over a specific territory. My com-
ments pertain to the controversy over the delineation 
of such an area, a territory I will call "the Tamil 
region." 
At first glance, it would seem that a map showing the 
spatial distribution of people according to their ethnic-
ity would provide a fairly objective method for draw-
ing boundaries. However, even so-called objective 
regionalization depends upon agreement about, at 
least, four conditions which involve fundamental geo-
graphic issues. These are: 
• The definition of the pertinent population. What 
constitutes membership in the ethnic group being 
regionalized is illustrated in Sri Lanka by the uncer-
tain status of those classified as Indian Tamils. 
Because the Indian Tamils have an uncertain citizen-
ship status, have been less politically active, and 
generally belong to a lower caste than the Sri Lan-
kan Tamils, they are usually omitted from the popu-
lation that defines the Tamil region. But such an 
omission is not universally accepted and, as I will 
presently show, the inclusion of Indian Tamils can 
make a difference. 
• The definition of ethnic territory. Territorial belong-
ingness is normally based upon the existence of a 
demographic majority. But in a census unit where no 
group exceeds 50 percent, a case can be made for 
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defining territorial belongingness to the group hav-
ing only a plurality. In most administrative subdivi-
sions of Sri Lanka, one or another of the ethnic 
groups has a very large majority, so the potential for 
this kind of controversy is limited to only a few 
areas. But these few areas are the critical places of 
conflict and are where "ethnic cleansing" is most 
likely to occur. Even though intense fighting has 
taken place in the Tamil heartland of Jaffna, some of 
the severest suffering by noncombatants has 
occurred in the peripheral or frontier areas, where no 
ethnic group possesses a majority. 
• The size of the areal units. The real crux of the terri-
torial problem is one of scale because the homoge-
neity of a region depends upon the size of the areal 
unit that is being clustered to form a regional whole. 
• The decision about the necessity for regional conti-
guity. There is a strong argument for avoiding ethnic 
enclaves in any administrative unit. In the Sri Lan-
kan situation, it is difficult to achieve complete con-
tiguity because of the spatial distributions of the 
ethnic populations. 
Let us examine this regionalization task-that is, the 
objective delineation of a Tamil region-by looking at 
the distributions of ethnic populations at three areal 
scales. 
On the provincial level, eight of the nine Sri Lankan 
provinces have large majorities consisting of only a 
single ethnic group. Furthermore, their geographic 
arrangement does not violate the goal of contiguity 
(figure 13). In the Eastern Province, however, the larg-
est group has only a plurality. Sri Lankan Tamils, who 
have the plurality in this province, insist that it should 
be part of their region of control, even though it differs 
a little bit from the traditional historical lands. The 
government disagrees. 
If we look at the district level, the complexity of the 
territorial issue is even more evident. In over half the 
24 districts, the majority ethnic group exceeds 80 per-
cent of the population. In only three districts does the 
Figure 13 
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percentage drop below 50 percent. However, the loca-
tion-and here we come into the geographic aspects 
that were emphasized by Dr. Murphy-of these three 
districts complicates the task of regionalization. Two 
of the plurality districts-Trincomalee and Amparai-
are in Eastern Province and present the same defini-
tional problem as produced by the larger provincial 
units. The third district, Nuwara Eliya, is located in 
the center of the country, where it is surrounded by 
Sinhalese majority districts. Furthermore, the ethnic 
population that holds the plurality is the Indian Tamil 
community. Therefore, if a definition of "Tamil popu-
lation" were to be expanded to combine both the Sri 
Lankan and Indian Tamils, the resulting different eth-
nic map would produce a Tamil region having a non-
contiguous exclave. 
Minor civil divisions below the district level are too 
small for political autonomy. That does not mean, 
however, that these units cannot be used as a basis for 
a regionalization scheme. However, the spatial frag-
mentation of the Sri Lankan Tamils in the peripheral 
zone persists at this scale. In the Trincomalee District, 
the population residing along a narrow coastal sliver 
forms a plur.ality consisting of a third ethnic group-
the Moors. The geometric complexity of ethnic con-
centrations is partially solved if the Sri Lankan Tamils 
and Indian Tamils are considered as members of the 
same ethnic category because the plurality population 
of this coastal strip shifts to being Tamil. Although 
such a redefinition of the Tamil population tends to 
solve some of the problems of contiguity along the 
east coast, as noted above, it complicates the regional-
ization task in the central part of the country. 
Thus, it is evident that a major contributor to ethnic 
conflicts is the distributional pattern of contending 
populations. Also, this Sri Lankan situation reinforces 
the generalization made yesterday: the areas where 
atrocities are most likely to occur, and from which 
most refugees would originate, are the zones of ethnic 
transition between the regional core areas of the dif-
fering ethnic groups. 
Now, let me shift to the second topic which concerns 
India, where I would like to deal with a nonterritorial 
conflict. My own interests have usually focused upon 
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ethnoregionalism more than on the non spatial inter-
class struggles for power. However, interclass strate-
gies have real implications for the Hindu nationalist 
movement. 
It is critical to note that we are dealing with two major 
perspectives on Indian nationalism, the secular and the 
Hindu. Indian secular nationalism is well illustrated 
by the leadership of Nehru, who expounded, prac-
ticed, and institutionalized the pluralistic society. 
From this perspective, the Indian nation-state is based 
upon a syncretic view of Indian culture and a federal 
system of government. All religions, alljatis, all lan-
guages, and all people within the territory of this 
country have equal opportunity under the law, accord-
ing to the Constitution. The laws of the land accom-
modate both the wishes of the majority, as expressed 
by free and democratic elections, and the rights of the 
minorities. 
In contrast, Hindu nationalists believe that the nation 
should be based not only on common culture but also 
upon the religion of Hinduism. The more extreme 
forms want to rule India as a Hindu state and rid the 
country of all non-Hindu persons and influences. The 
more benign forms of Hindu nationalism seek unity 
among the various castes and languages in India 
through the common heritage of living within a "Hin-
duized" land. 
From the perspective of the Hindu nationalists, Bud-
dhists, J ains, and Sikhs already share a more or less 
simliar sacred geography. Because of their origins, 
their holy lands are within the same Hinduized land. 
The Jews and the Parsis came from foreign areas, but, 
because these communities are small, they have not 
been a particular problem. On the other hand, Hindus 
view Christians and Muslims-with their doctrinaire 
ideas-as a problem. The nonacceptance of Muslims 
is especially strong because: 
• Muslims are associated with the invasions from 
circa 1000 to later than 1500. 
• Some Muslim leaders, insisting that Muslims belong 
to a separate nation, carved Pakistan from a "part of 
India." 
• The Indian Muslim population is large enough to 
make a significant difference. 
If the BJP were to gain national power, it is difficult to 
predict whether stability would be restored to the 
nation. But we can predict that, if the right wing of the 
Hindu nationalists should gain power, there would 
most likely be mass, even widespread, conflicts in 
areas where significant Muslim populations now live. 
A plausible scenario would be massive outmigrations 
similar to those that occurred during partition. A worst 
case scenario would be another war between India and 
Pakistan-this time with nuclear weapons. 
In spite of several conditions that can lead to conflict, 
there are strong reasons for believing that India will 
not erupt into major ethnic wars, with the possible 
exception of Kashmir. Other than Kashmir, there is 
strong evidence that India is not as ethnically volatile 
as many other regions in the world. First, note that the 
population of India exceeds all of Africa, all of Latin 
America, or all of Europe, none of which is in a single 
nation-state or single country. All these other regions 
are splintered into many states, and the people within 
each show little evidence of uniting politically. In con-
trast, even with all the diversity among the people of 
India, the nation has remained together for almost half 
a century. Furthermore, this has been accomplished 
within a mostly democratic environment again, some-
thing that has not been achieved in Third World coun-
tries in Africa or in Latin America. It also contrasts 
with the situation in Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union, where ethnic feelings were suppressed 
by dictatorial governments. That success provides a 
basis for predicting that ethnic conflicts will not be 
more severe in India than elsewhere. 
A second reason for predicting fewer ethnic conflicts 
within India than in many other major world regions is 
based on the Indic culture. Maybe India's success is 
just a happenstance of outstanding secular leadership 
at the time of, and immediately after, independence 
and, therefore, will dissipate with time. Yet, secular 
nationalism does seem to have a firm foundation, 
namely the Indic culture, which has nurtured tolerance 
148 
and has accommodated differences through the ages. 
The eclectic and nonideological nature of Hinduism 
and the other indigenous religions of South Asia cer-
tainly provides a deeply ingrained cultural propensity 
for the acceptance of differences. It is true that 
throughout most of history the people of the subconti-
nent did not live in a single political unit and that the 
various regional states did engage in fighting, but 
most conflicts did not result from the kind of major 
ideological crusade that separates people for centuries 
and produces long-lasting hatreds. 
Certainly it is in the best interest of the United States, 
as the leader of the democratic world, to support the 
forces of pluralism in South Asia. 
General Discussion 
DR. GLADNEY: I am always, and I think everybody 
is, amazed that India is still together. You mentioned 
the term success in that regard. I wonder if you could 
talk a little bit more about why this is a success, par-
ticularly considering the poverty of India, the civil 
strife, the Hindu-Muslim clashes, and the separatists 
like the Kashmiris. Why is it that keeping the country 
together is successful? 
DR. STODDARD: Maybe the term "success" is a lit-
tle bit strong, especially if we define a successful state 
as one that eliminates poverty, as well as reducing 
civil strife. And, I do not deny that the Hindu-Muslim 
clashes are just as worrisome in India as religious con-
flicts in Northern Ireland, in the Caucasus, or in Leba-
non. Furthermore, half a century may be too short a 
time to declare full success. Moreover, the durability 
of India as a state may partly reflect the lack of a 
highly politicized populace. After all, the 67 percent 
of the population that resides in rural areas live a life 
that is pretty much circumscribed by their local envi-
ronment. Although there is a rising politicization, as 
expressed by the percentage of people who have voted 
in the recent elections, the stability of a peasant agrar-
ian economy or agrarian society probably goes a long 
way toward explaining the relative success. 
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: The Indian Government has 
been willing to pull back. This has not happened yet in 
Kashmir and Punjab, however. 
QUESTION: Would you comment on the Kashmir sit-
uation? 
DR. SCHWARTZBERG: I plan to work on Kashmir 
during the coming year. The people in Kashmir are 
alienated to a degree that will preclude their reconcili-
ation with India. I cannot predict exactly the shape of 
the future of Kashmir, but I will predict that there will 
be a significant change in the situation there. 
I am more optimistic in the case of Punjab, a richer 
area and strategically much more important. There 
seem to be signs that India has the Punjab situation 
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under control. However, the raid on the Golden Tem-
ple will not soon be forgotten, nor the many other 
human rights abuses that the Indian Government has 
committed in the name of quelling that insurrection. I 
believe, however, that the prospects for reconciliation 
exist, and many people who know Punjab better than I 
do say that, even at the worst of times, the majority of 
Sikhs were always moderate and that the extremists 
never represented the Sikh rank and file. 
One fundamental difference between Kashmir and the 
Punjab is that the dissociation of Punjab from India 
would probably let loose an unstoppable Balkaniza-
tion of India, while dissociation of Kashmir would not 
necessarily result in such an outcome. 
